Naturalism and the Scientific Status of the Social Sciences -- Reconsidering Gilbert's Account of Social Norms -- Theories for Use: On the Bearing of Basic Science on Practical Problems -- Structural Realism as a Form of Humility -- Approaching the Truth via Belief Change in Propositional Languages -- Can Graphical Causal Inference Be Extended to Nonlinear Settings? -- Towards a Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation -- Epistemic Accuracy and Subjective Probability -- Interpretation in the Natural Sciences -- Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity -- Why Should Philosophers of Science Pay Attention to the Commercialization of Academic Science? -- Some Consequences of the Pragmatist Approach to Representation -- The Gray Area for Incorruptible Scientific Research -- Epistemic Replacement Relativism Defended -- Models and Truth -- Theory Change, Truthlikeness, and Belief Revision -- Mechanisms: Are Activities up to the Job? -- Why the Model-Theoretic View of Theories Does Not Adequately Depict the Methodology of Theory Application -- A Deflationary, Neo-Mertonian Critique of Academic Patenting -- 'I Want to Look Like a Lady, Not Like a Factory Worker' Rose Rand, a Woman Philosopher of the Vienna Circle -- Natural Kind Theory as a Tool for Philosophers of Science -- Whence Ontological Structural Realism? -- Local, General and Universal Prediction Methods: A Game-Theoretical Approach to the Problem of Induction -- Multiple Contraction Revisited -- Statistical Inference Without Frequentist Justifications -- Carnap and the Perils of Ramseyfication -- Naturalizing Meaning Through Epistemology: Some Critical Notes -- What Games Do Scientists Play? Rationality and Objectivity in a Game-Theoretic Approach to the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge.