Philosophy and Metatheory of Psychology -- Keynote Address -- Unifying Psychology: Its Preconditions -- Plenary Session I: Theoretical Alternatives -- A Phenomenological Vision for Psychology -- For a Materialist Psychology -- Realities and Their Relationships -- The Myth of Mind and the Mistake of Psychology -- Hermeneutics of Explanation: Or, if Science is Theoretical why Isn't Psychology? -- Do Mental Events Exist? -- What Distinguishes Lay Persons' Psychological Explanations From Those of Psychologists? -- Theory of Action in Psychology: A Narrative Perspective -- Probability and Meaning: A Division in Behavioral Cognition Dividing Behavioral Science -- Naturalism and Intentionality -- A Hermeneutical Analysis of the Social-Psychological -- 'Doing Theory' in Psychology: Feminist Reactions -- Münchhausen-Objectivity: A Bootstrap-Conception of Objectivity as a Methodological Norm -- Psychology and the Problem of Verisimilitude -- Identifying the Properties of Linguistically Expressed Experience: Empirical Induction or Intuition of Essences? -- The Scientist Who Mistook His Object for a Method, or: Can We Make a Non-Classical Psychology? -- Theoretical Psychology -- Essential Unpredictability -- John Dewey's Reconstruction of the Reflex-Arc Concept and its Relevance for Bowlby's Attachment Theory -- Two Conceptions of Stage Structure and the Problem of Novelty in Development -- Thinking of Emotions: A Socio-Cognitive View -- Thinking in Society -- The Mutual Construction of Social and Self: A Social Critique of Social Cognition -- From Feminist Research to New Categories in Psychology: What Is and What May Be -- Mental Representation and Meaning: Arguments Against the Computational View -- Cognitive Representations and Intentionality and the Realism-Relativism Controversy -- The Computational Theory of Mind and Constraints on the Notions of Symbol and Mental Representation -- Bottom-Up Approaches to Cognition: A Defence of Cognitive Neuroscience -- Historical Analyses of Psychological Theory -- Plenary Session II: Contribution of History to Theory -- The Social Context of Research Practice and the History of Psychology -- Recontextualization as a Contribution of History to Theoretical Psychology -- In Praise of 'Problemgeschichte' -- How Can Intellectual History Help Us to Understand Psychological Theories? -- The Origins and Significance of Clark L. Hull's Theory of Value -- Interactionist Theory and Disciplinary Interactions: Psychology, Sociology and Social Psychology in France -- A Cognitive Revolution in Infancy Research? -- Piaget, Vygotsky, and the Development of Consciousness -- The Significance of Bühler's 'Axiomatic' and Vygotsky's 'General Psychology' for Theoretical Psychology and its Persistent Monism-Pluralism-Debate -- Demystifying Vygotsky's Concept of the Zone of Proximal Development -- Personal and Social Preconceptions in the Formation of Psycho/Sociological Theory: Freud's Seduction Hypothesis and the Case of Child Sexual Abuse -- Freud's Doctor's Bag: On His Heuristic Resources -- On the Function of Folk Psychology in the Theory and History of Psychology -- Advancement of Substantive Theory -- A Functional Theory of Illness -- Tests Versus Contests: A Theory of Adjudication -- A General Model for Interindividual Comparison -- Toward a Theory of Human Communication -- What is Psychologic? -- Author Index.