Too-Big-to-Fail in Banking Impact of G-SIB Designation and Regulation on Relative Equity Valuations
Başlık:
Too-Big-to-Fail in Banking Impact of G-SIB Designation and Regulation on Relative Equity Valuations
ISBN:
9783658341824
Personal Author:
Edition:
1st ed. 2021.
Yayın Bilgileri:
Wiesbaden : Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden : Imprint: Springer Gabler, 2021.
Fiziksel Tanımlama:
XIX, 248 p. 36 illus. online resource.
Series:
Finanzwirtschaft, Banken und Bankmanagement I Finance, Banks and Bank Management,
Contents:
1 Introduction and Overview -- 2 A Primer for Economics of Banking -- Part I Too-Big-to-Fail in Banking Review -- 3 Introduction to Too-Big-to-Fail in Banking -- 4 TBTF Causal Chain: Explicit and Implicit Government Guarantees -- 5 Public Cost and Benets of TBTF -- 6 TBTF Policy Recommendations -- 7 TBTF Policy Initiatives -- 8 Conclusion -- Part II Quantifying the Shareholder Value of Too-Big-to-Fail in Banking -- 9 Related Research -- 10 Hypothesis Development -- 11 Empirical Methodology and Data -- 12 Results and Discussion -- 13 Conclusion.
Abstract:
This book provides a comprehensive summary of the latest academic research on the important topic of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) in banking. It explains TBTF from various perspectives including the range of regulatory measures proposed to counter TBTF, most notably the globally accepted regulation of global-systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and its main tool of capital surcharges. The empirical analysis quantifies the shareholder value of the G-SIB attribution by using quarterly observations from more than 750 global banks between Q2 2008 and Q3 2015. The main finding is that G-SIBs are confronted with a substantial relative valuation discount compared to non-G-SIBs. From the end of 2011 until the end of 2015, a stable discount of 0.6x-0.8x price-to-tangible common equity (P/TCE) is statistically highly significant. The results suggest that the G-SIB designation effect, which positively impacts G-SIBs' share prices because of funding benefits from IGGs, is dominated by the regulatory G-SIB burden effect, which negatively impacts G-SIBs' share prices because of lower profitability due to capital surcharges and other regulatory requirements placed on G-SIBs. The findings re-open the debate about whether breaking up G-SIBs would unlock shareholder value and whether G-SIBs are regulated efficiently. About the Author Dr. Tom Filip Lesche is a venture capitalist investing into financial technology companies. Previously he was an investment banker advising financial institutions on capital markets and M&A transactions.
Ek Kurum Yazarı:
Elektronik Erişim:
Full Text Available From Springer Nature Economics and Finance 2021 Packages
Dil:
English