Acknowledgments -- Credits -- List of abbreviations -- Introduction -- Chapter one: Varieties of Mental States -- 1. Sensations and perceptions -- The objectivity of perceptual representation -- Perceptual contents -- Sensory states and sensations -- 2. Two kinds of propositional attitudes: dispositions and commitments -- Propositional attitudes as dispositions -- Propositional attitudes as commitments -- 3. Emotions -- Emotions as sensations -- Emotions as evaluative judgments -- Emotions as felt bodily attitudes -- Emotions as perceptions of evaluative properties -- The borderline view of emotions -- 4. Summary -- Chapter two: Varieties of Self-Knowledge -- 1. First personal self-knowledge -- Groundlessness -- Transparency -- Authority -- 2. Counterexamples from content externalism and cognitive science? -- 3. Third-personal self-knowledge -- 4. Summary -- Chapter three: Epistemically Robust Accounts -- 1. Inner sense theories: Armstrong and Lycan -- 2. Inferential theories: Gopnik and Cassam -- 3. Simulation-theories: Goldman and Gordon -- 4. Summary -- Chapter four: Epistemically Weak Accounts -- 1. Peacocke's rational internalism -- 2. Burge's rational externalism -- 3. Evans' transparency method -- 3.1 Fernández' epistemic account -- 3.2 Moran's deliberative account -- 4. Summary -- Chapter five: Expressivism about Self-Knowledge -- 1. At the origins of expressivism: Wittgenstein -- 2. Bar-On's neo-expressivism -- 3. Summary -- Chapter six: Constitutive Theories -- 1. The left-to-right side of the Constitutive Thesis: Shoemaker -- 2. The right-to-left side of the Constitutive Thesis: Wright -- 3. The two sides of the Constitutive Thesis: Bilgrami -- 4. A metaphysically robust kind of constitutivism: Coliva -- The first half of the constitutive thesis: transparency -- Objections from empirical psychology -- The second half of the constitutive thesis: authority -- 5. Summary -- Chapter seven: Pluralism about Self-Knowledge -- 1. Propositional attitudes as commitments: the limits of constitutive accounts -- 2. Sensations, basic emotions and perceptions and perceptual experiences: constitutivism meets expressivism -- Sensations -- Basic emotions -- Perceptions and perceptual experiences -- 3. Propositional attitudes as dispositions and complex emotions: third-personal self-knowledge -- 4. Summary -- Appendix: Moore's Paradox -- 1. Moorean and Wittgensteinian analyses -- 2. The constraints on any feasible account of Moore's paradox -- 3. What Moore's paradox isn't about: Jane's off case -- 4. What Moore's paradox is about-first pass -- 5. What Moore's paradox is about-second pass -- 6. An objection -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Name index -- Subject index.