Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information için kapak resmi
Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information
Başlık:
Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information
ISBN:
9783642456145
Personal Author:
Edition:
1st ed. 1986.
Yayın Bilgileri:
Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 1986.
Fiziksel Tanımlama:
VIII, 212 p. online resource.
Series:
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 272
Contents:
Ch. 0: Introduction and General Overview -- 0.1 Subject and Scope -- 0.2 Summary of Contents -- Ch. 1: Approaches to Equilibrium Credit Rationing -- 1.1 A General Description of a Credit Market -- 1.2 Definition of Credit Rationing -- 1.3 Borrowers With Different Wealth Endowments -- 1.4 The Role of the Horizontal Integration of the Banking Firm -- 1.5 Implicit Contracts and Credit Rationing -- 1.6 Concluding Remarks -- Ch. 2: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Credit Rationing -- 2.1 The Basic Model -- 2.2 Projects of Different Riskiness -- 2.3 Borrowers of Different Honesty -- 2.4 Borrowers With Different Abilities -- 2.5 Unobservable Effort of Borrowers -- 2.6 Concluding Remarks -- Ch. 3: Credit Rationing in Multi-Period Models -- 3.1 Overview -- 3.2 Rationing as an Incentive Device -- 3.3 Experience Rating of Borrowers -- 3.4 Rationing With Endogenous Costs of Default -- 3.5 Bankruptcy as a Joint Decision of Bank and Borrower -- 3.6 Concluding Remarks -- Ch. 4: Screening vs. Rationing. The Role of Collateral -- 4.1 Overview -- 4.2 Projects of Different Riskiness -- 4.3 The Jaffee and Russell Model -- 4.4 Borrowers With Different Abilities -- 4.5 Borrowers With Unobservable Effort -- 4.6 Concluding Remarks -- Ch. 5: Loan Markets With Perfectly Divisible Projects -- 5.1 Overview -- 5.2 A Loan Market With Certain Returns -- 5.3 A Loan Market With Uncertain Returns -- 5.4 The Nash-Equilibrium With Borrowers of Different Abilities -- Ch. 6: Variable Loan Size, Signalling and Endogenous Information -- 6.1 Overview -- 6.2 Success-Failure Projects and Different Abilities -- 6.3 Strategic Stability of Credit Market Equilibria -- 6.4 Projects of Different Riskiness -- 6.5 Borrowers With Different Default Costs -- 6.6 Exchange of Information Between Banks -- 6.7 Concluding Remarks 173 Appendix -- Ch. 7: Variable Loan Size and Type II Rationing -- 7.1 Overview -- 7.2 The Basic Model -- 7.3 Loan Applicants With Different Default Costs -- 7.4 Loan Applicants With Different Abilities -- 7.5 Projects of Different Riskiness -- 7.6 The Role of Effort -- 7.7 Concluding Remarks -- Ch. 8: Epilogue: Whither Now.
Dil:
English